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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal presents a question of first impression in 
this Court: does an inmate’s placement in administrative 
segregation while he is under investigation for a new crime 
trigger his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment 
or the Speedy Trial Act? We hold it does not, so Bailey-Snyder 
was not entitled to dismissal of his complaint. Nor was there 
improper vouching or cumulative error in Bailey-Snyder’s 
trial. We will affirm. 
I 
While incarcerated at the Federal Correctional 
Institution, Schuylkill, James Bailey-Snyder was moved to 
administrative segregation after officers found a seven-inch 
homemade plastic weapon (shank) on his person. United States 
v. Bailey-Snyder, 2017 WL 6055344, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 
2017). He remained in isolation in the Special Handling Unit 
(SHU) pending further investigation by the FBI. Id. 
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Ten months later, Bailey-Snyder was indicted in June 
2016 on one count of possession of a prohibited object in 
prison. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2), (b)(3). He pleaded not 
guilty and filed a number of motions for extension before filing 
a motion to dismiss in November 2017. Bailey-Snyder, 2017 
WL 6055344, at *1. Focusing on his placement in 
administrative segregation as the start of the speedy trial clock, 
Bailey-Snyder moved to dismiss his indictment, alleging 
violations of his constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy 
trial. Id. 
The District Court denied the motion to dismiss without 
an evidentiary hearing, reasoning that placement in the SHU 
does not constitute an arrest or accusation that would trigger 
speedy trial rights. See id. at *2. The case went to trial a month 
later. 
The trial focused on the credibility of the two officers 
who testified that they found a shank on Bailey-Snyder’s 
person when they searched him in a staff bathroom that was 
not equipped with cameras. In an effort to undermine the 
officers’ credibility, defense counsel cross-examined them 
regarding the Bureau of Prisons incentive programs for 
recovering contraband. On redirect, the Government elicited 
that the programs do not reward individual contraband 
recoveries and that one of the officers did not receive any 
award for the search of Bailey-Snyder. The other officer had 
made similar points during the defense’s cross-examination. 
Neither officer discussed the potential consequences they 
would face for planting a shank on an inmate and then lying 
about it. The Government’s only other witness was the FBI 
agent who investigated the case. The defense rested without 
offering testimony or evidence. 
4 
 
Following the Court’s charge to the jury, both parties 
gave closing statements. The Government’s closing and 
rebuttal drew two defense objections relevant to this appeal. 
During summation, the prosecutor concluded: “I feel as if I’m 
not up here long enough. There really isn’t much to say. The 
defendant is guilty of his crime and we’re asking you to find 
him guilty of it. Thank you, your Honor.” App. 232. The 
defense objected on the basis that the prosecutor expressed 
personal belief in the defendant’s guilt; the District Court 
agreed, so the prosecutor had to make a corrected statement to 
the jury.1 The defense’s closing focused on the searching 
officers’ “believability.” App. 234. After tying “policy 
incentives of the Bureau of Prisons” to the searching officers’ 
motives, the defense claimed: “[a]nd I wouldn’t buy the home 
on the word of either of the two people that were on that stand 
if I were you.” App. 234–35. In response to that challenge to 
the officers’ credibility, the Government argued in rebuttal: 
“[i]t’s conjecture to say that these correctional officers would 
put their jobs, their careers, their livelihoods on the line to 
possibly plant a shank on this defendant to maybe, maybe, have 
a little notch to get a promotion.” App. 237. The defense 
objected, claiming the Government was “arguing a fact not in 
evidence,” but the Court overruled the objection. App. 238.  
                                                 
1 “Ladies and gentlemen, I think near the end of my oral 
argument to you I indicated that if you find that the defendant is 
guilty you should find him so. I think I may have mumbled 
during the beginning of that and said the defendant is guilty, you 
should find him guilty. What I really meant to say if you found, 
if within your common sense, and when you look at all the 
testimony and all the evidence presented, if you find that he’s 
guilty you should find him guilty.” App. 233–34. 
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The jury convicted Bailey-Snyder and he was sentenced 
to 30 months’ imprisonment to run consecutively to his 
underlying offense of conviction. This timely appeal followed. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
III 
The question whether speedy trial rights attach when a 
prisoner is placed in administrative segregation is one of first 
impression for our Court. Bailey-Snyder argues that the 
District Court should have dismissed his indictment because 
the 10 months and 18 days2 between his placement in the SHU 
and his indictment violated his right to a speedy trial under the 
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution and the Speedy Trial 
Act.  
A 
We begin with Bailey-Snyder’s constitutional 
argument. The Sixth Amendment states: “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
                                                 
2 Although Bailey-Snyder’s brief references 
“approximately eleven-month segregation,” e.g., Opening Br. 
14, it also concedes we should not count “approximately 75 
days” from this period because of “violations committed while 
in SHU.” Id. So the time period at issue is closer to eight 
months. Bailey-Snyder also does not challenge the time 
between the indictment and trial. 
6 
 
public trial.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This guarantee attaches 
at a defendant’s arrest or indictment, whichever comes first, 
because it does not “require the Government to discover, 
investigate, and accuse any person within any particular period 
of time.” United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971); 
see id. at 321 (declining to extend the constitutional speedy 
trial right “to the period prior to arrest”); United States v. 
Velazquez, 749 F.3d 161, 183 (3d Cir. 2014).  
We again decline to extend the constitutional speedy 
trial right “to the period prior to arrest.” Id. (quoting Marion, 
404 U.S. at 321). Unlike police and prosecutors, the Bureau of 
Prisons does not operate in a prosecutorial posture when it 
decides to place prisoners in administrative segregation. Such 
decisions are not dependent on a decision to prosecute. Indeed, 
here it preceded any such decision. Prison officials instead 
segregate inmates for myriad reasons, including: investigation, 
discipline, protection, prevention, and transition. See generally 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT 
CPD/CSB 5270.10 (effective Aug. 1, 2011) (detailing 
objectives and policies of SHUs, including reasons for 
placement there), superseded by PROGRAM STATEMENT 
CPD/CSB 5270.11 (effective Nov. 23, 2016) (same). Neither 
the United States Attorney nor the FBI orders these placements 
and they are not typically notified when such placements are 
made. For that reason, SHU placements have their own 
administrative review and appeals processes. See generally id. 
(citing Administrative Remedy Program, 28 C.F.R. § 542, 
subpart B). 
Our holding today is consistent with all five courts of 
appeals that have considered the issue. See United States v. 
Wearing, 837 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); 
United States v. Daniels, 698 F.2d 221, 223 (4th Cir. 1983); 
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United States v. Mills, 641 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 1981); 
United States v. Blevins, 593 F.2d 646, 647 (5th Cir. 1979) (per 
curiam); United States v. Bambulas, 571 F.2d 525, 527 (10th 
Cir. 1978) (per curiam). Our sister courts have persuasively 
rebutted the reasons Bailey-Snyder asks us to break ranks with 
them. Citing the factors in Marion that inform the speedy trial 
right, Bailey-Snyder argues that SHU placement (like an 
arrest): restrains the inmate’s liberty, worries friends and 
family, prevents the inmate from gathering evidence, and 
focuses the prison population’s obloquy on the segregated 
inmate. But such placement occurs in “the peculiar context of 
a penal institution where the curtailment of liberty is the 
general rule, not the exception.” Daniels, 698 F.2d at 223 n.1 
(quoting Mills, 641 F.2d at 787). That administrative context 
explains why inmates like Bailey-Snyder have an opportunity 
to administratively challenge their segregation’s length prior to 
arrest or accusation, and why administrative segregation does 
not constitute an arrest or public accusation for purposes of the 
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. 
In sum, because Bailey-Snyder was not arrested when 
he was placed in administrative segregation, his Sixth 
Amendment right to a speedy trial did not attach and his 
constitutional right was not violated. 
B 
We turn next to Bailey-Snyder’s statutory argument. 
Congress enacted the Speedy Trial Act to give effect to the 
Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial guarantee by setting time 
limits within which trials must begin. United States v. Rivera 
Constr. Co., 863 F.2d 293, 295 (3d Cir. 1988). The Speedy 
Trial Act requires the Government to “file an indictment or 
information against a defendant ‘within thirty days from the 
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date on which such individual was arrested or served with a 
summons in connection with such charges.’” United States v. 
Oliver, 238 F.3d 471, 473 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3161(b)).  
For the same reasons we rejected Bailey-Snyder’s 
constitutional argument, we hold that administrative 
segregation is not an arrest for purposes of § 3161(b). In doing 
so, we again join every other circuit court of appeals that has 
addressed this question. See Wearing, 837 F.3d at 908 (per 
curiam); United States v. Harris, 12 F.3d 735, 736 (7th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Jackson, 781 F.2d 1114, 1115 (5th Cir. 
1986) (per curiam). Bailey-Snyder was already imprisoned for 
another offense, so several non-prosecutorial reasons justified 
his segregation once he was found in possession of a lethal 
weapon. Moreover, he could have challenged his prolonged 
SHU placement independent of the Speedy Trial Act. See 
Administrative Remedy Program, 28 C.F.R. § 542, subpart B; 
PROGRAM STATEMENT 5270.11.  
IV 
In addition to his legal arguments regarding his speedy 
trial rights, Bailey-Snyder claims he is entitled to a new trial 
because of improper comments by the prosecutor during his 
summation. Bailey-Snyder claims the prosecutor’s comments 
about the credibility of the Government’s two key witnesses 
constituted improper vouching.  
Three things are required to reverse a conviction for 
improper vouching: (1) the prosecution assured the jury of its 
witnesses’ credibility, (2) the assurance came from fact(s) not 
in the record, and (3) the assurance prejudiced the defendant. 
See United States v. Walker, 155 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 1998); 
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United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(en banc). A statement that an “officer would be risking his 
career to lie under oath” may or may not constitute improper 
vouching, depending on the context. United States v. 
Weatherly, 525 F.3d 265, 271 (3d Cir. 2008). 
In Weatherly, the prosecutor posed this rhetorical 
question to the jury: “Why would Officer[s] . . . risk their 32–
34 years of experience on the police force over this case?” 525 
F.3d at 271. We held that question was not improper for three 
reasons. See id. at 271–73. First, evidence in the record showed 
that discipline generally affects officers’ careers, which 
allowed the jury to conclude that officers could risk their 
careers by committing misconduct. That defeated an element 
of improper vouching: fact(s) not of record. See id. at 271–72. 
Second, the prosecutor’s question reasonably responded to the 
defense’s own speculative attacks on the officers’ credibility, 
which excused any impropriety. See id. at 272. And third, even 
if improper, the defendant was not prejudiced because the 
brief, isolated comment was responsive to defense attacks and 
because the judge had “thoroughly instructed” the jury that 
counsel’s statements were not evidence. Id. at 272–73. We also 
noted that arguing an officer “had too much to lose to commit 
perjury merely to convict th[e] defendant” could be “a common 
sense conclusion” the prosecution may properly ask the jury to 
reach without evidence in the record to support it. Id. at 271 
n.7 (quoting United States v. Bethancourt, 65 F.3d 1074, 1082 
(3d Cir. 1995) (McKee, J., dissenting)). In other words, such a 
statement may not be improper vouching at all. 
In this appeal, the Government’s comment was similar 
to the rhetorical question in Weatherly. The prosecutor said: 
“It’s conjecture to say that these correctional officers would put 
their jobs, their careers, their livelihoods on the line to possibly 
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plant a shank on this defendant to maybe, maybe, have a little 
notch to get a promotion.” App. 237. We hold that this common 
sense conclusion was not improper vouching, even without 
explicit evidence in the record to support it. Although neither 
officer testified that they risked their jobs if they planted a 
shank on Bailey-Snyder, it should be obvious that falsifying 
evidence, filing dishonest sworn reports, and lying in open 
court should (and would) jeopardize one’s career as a 
correctional officer. The Government’s comment was “brief 
and appropriate,” Weatherly, 525 F.3d at 272, and exactly “the 
kind of effective and logical response to an attack on an agent’s 
credibility that has been made in countless numbers of closing 
arguments, and will be made in countless more.” Id. at 271 n.7 
(quoting Bethancourt, 65 F.3d at 1082 (McKee, J., 
dissenting)). Although there was no admitted evidence of 
discipline affecting these officers’ careers—and although the 
Government’s case depended entirely on the officers’ 
testimony—the Government briefly responded to the defense’s 
credibility attacks with a proper, common sense conclusion. 
Also like in Weatherly, the challenged statement here 
does not involve the prosecutor “invok[ing] his own oath of 
office to defend the [officers’] credibility,” which we have held 
to be improper. Id. (citing United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 
1084, 1125 (3d Cir. 1990)). In Pungitore, the prosecutor’s 
improper vouching took the form of claiming “the U.S. 
Attorneys and law enforcement could not have behaved as 
unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged they did without 
violating their oaths of office and jeopardizing their careers.” 
910 F.2d at 1125. Here, the prosecutor did not invoke his oath 
of office. Indeed, the Government here did not “vouch” in the 
strictest sense of the word: it did not swear to or make promises 
about the officers’ credibility. Instead, the Government 
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supported its witnesses’ credibility by pointing out obvious 
consequences they would face for lying after the defense 
insinuated they had a motive to do so. The Government need 
not have elicited testimony or admitted evidence that planting 
evidence and then lying about it under oath would harm their 
careers before saying so in rebuttal. 
We also note that, even if the Government’s comment 
were improper vouching, it still would be excusable here as “a 
reasonable response to allegations of perjury by [the defense.]” 
Weatherly, 525 F.3d at 272. As in Weatherly, Bailey-Snyder’s 
single theory was that the officers who discovered the shank 
had a motive (the prison’s incentive policies) and opportunity 
to fabricate doing so. See id. The defense’s closing focused on 
those motives and incentives to find shanks, even though 
nothing in the record established they affected these officers. 
So the defense speculated about the officers’ motives, and the 
Government’s brief, logical response appropriately 
characterized that as “conjecture.” App. 237; see Weatherly, 
525 F.3d at 272. 
V 
Lastly, we address cumulative error. To reverse a 
conviction for cumulative error requires more than one error. 
See United States v. Hill, 976 F.2d 132, 145 (3d Cir. 1992). 
And this is a demanding standard that warrants reversal only 
when the combined errors “so infected the jury’s deliberations 
that they had a substantial influence on the outcome of the 
trial.” Id.  
Because the Government’s comment about its 
witnesses’ credibility was proper, there is no error to 
compound with the Government’s comment on Bailey-
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Snyder’s guilt. Even if there were unexcused improper 
vouching, the Government’s brief comment about Bailey-
Snyder’s guilt was stricken by the Court, and immediately 
corrected by the Government itself. See supra Note 1. 
Furthermore, the Court had instructed the jury before closing 
that lawyers’ statements, including those made in closing, are 
not evidence. These facts leave us with little reason to believe 
that the Government’s statements improperly influenced the 
jury at all, let alone substantially. Thus, there was no 
cumulative error. 
* * * 
The District Court did not err in denying Bailey-
Snyder’s motion to dismiss the indictment for a speedy trial 
violation. Nor was there improper vouching or cumulative 
error at trial. We will therefore affirm the judgment of 
conviction and sentence. 
